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Critical analyses of neoliberalism's influence on fisheries governance have documented how enclosure,
quota leasing and renting, and commodification can precipitate negative social consequences for fishing
communities. By contrast, this paper draws on the concept of embeddedness to argue that certain
policies and social relations can regulate enclosure, quota renting, and commodification in ways that
empower community-based groups to facilitate the anchoring of fishery resources and wealth in coastal
communities. It does so through an analysis of northern shrimp fisheries in Newfoundland and Labrador,
Canada, between the 1970s and the early 2000s. This case study illustrates how fisheries enclosure
policies informed by geographically and morally defined principles of access and equity and limits on
commodification can meaningfully embed fishery resources and benefits in rural and remote coastal
regions that depend on small-scale fishing. Although the application of social principles continues to be
marginalized in the context of neoliberal policy regimes that privilege individual economic efficiency
over distributive concerns, this paper provides new insight into the conditions under which principles of
ethical allocation and distribution of resources are able to persist through an era of neoliberalism.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Catch shares are part of the long-term enclosure and privatiza-
tion of open-access oceans [1], a process through which privileges
are allocated and privileged constituencies created [2,3]. They can
be defined as “a means of managing fisheries by allocating a
specific portion of the total allowable catch of a fish stock to
individuals, cooperatives, communities or other entities” [4,5].
Longstanding academic and policy debates over the impacts of
enclosure in fisheries have recently been reinvigorated in light of
the promotion, implementation, and critical examination of catch
share programs around the world [6]. Concerns over catch shares
are linked to evidence showing how enclosure through the
allocation of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) can have
negative effects on small-scale fisheries including on small-scale
boat owners, crew employment, households and communities [7].
ITQ catch shares are a form of both privatization (creation of
property) and marketization (creation of tradable property rights),
the latter of which is particularly important to those who claim
ITQs lead to increased economic efficiency. ITQ systems are also
widely considered a quintessential neoliberal governance mechan-
ism: “What makes ITQs different—and what makes them a
dimension of particularly neoliberal approaches to fisheries gov-
ernance—is that they marketize allocation of fish catch” [8]. The
policy debate over enclosing fisheries through catch shares centers
largely on the issues of whether and how such marketable, or
commodified, access alters the composition of the industry and its
relationship to communities and regions [9]. Because of the
commodification component of ITQs, the introduction of ITQs
often leads to a transfer of quota and resource wealth from small,
remote fishing dependent regions to larger fishing centers and to
the corporatization of fisheries that had been embedded in
primarily family-and community-based production systems [10].
This transfer of quotas and economic benefits out of smaller,
remote coastal communities has been documented in Canada
[11,12], Iceland [13], and Alaska [14,15,7]. In some cases these
transfers happened in spite of measures that were put in place to
limit the loss of quotas by smaller fishing communities [11]. Those
able to benefit most from the commodification of fishing rights
include larger firms or vertically integrated companies that
consolidate and sometimes rent or lease out rights [7]. Even when
fishers remain in coastal communities, significant portions
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of wealth can be lost to absentee owners through quota leasing
costs [12].
Despite widespread criticisms of ITQs and calls for developing
catch share designs to meet broader social goals, many policy
makers, conservation groups, and academics continue to promote
the neoliberal model of catch shares, which is distinguished by its
highly commodified access arrangements [8,16]. In the USA, for
example, regional management councils have relied on a limited
set of guidance documents in efforts to design catch share systems,
resulting effectively in the default development of individual quota
catch share systems with little consideration for alternative ways
that resource rights or privileges can be designed, created and
allocated [5]. Policies institutionalizing a narrow variant of catch
shares threaten to lock out alternative forms of access that have
provided or could provide people living in coastal communities an
opportunity to make livelihoods for themselves into the future.
Such policies also ignore research from social and natural scien-
tists that argue for a need to integrate wider goals and manage-
ment objectives beyond conservation of fish stocks, conservation
of marine ecosystems, and maximization of economic efficiency in
fisheries management. These include consideration of ethics and
justice [17,18]. Yet questions remain as to whether new forms of
enclosure that involve community allocations and social justice
considerations are nevertheless consistent with neoliberal
approaches to governance [8,3].
This paper contributes to policy and academic discussions
concerned with identifying and investigating alternative ways of
organizing fisheries systems, including designing catch share
systems within which attention is paid to both equity in access
[19] and the need to protect and even enhance the role of fisheries
in community and regional economic development. It does so
through a case study of a Canadian shrimp fishery, which provides
insight into the potential for institutions governed by principles of
distribution of access and benefits to persist through an era of
broader neoliberalization. In this fishery, management authorities
distributed allocations of shrimp to community-based organiza-
tions that then leased their quota to offshore fleets in return for
royalties and other economic benefits. These organizations further
embedded benefits in communities by reinvesting resource
rents to support regional inshore fishing and seafood processing
initiatives and other kinds of regional economic development
initiatives.
1.1. Case study and methods
This paper examines the case of allocation policies and devel-
opment outcomes within northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis)
fisheries in Atlantic Canada, with a focus on Newfoundland and
Labrador. Northern shrimp is a shellfish with significant popula-
tions from the Gulf of Maine to the waters between Baffin Island
and Greenland. Northern shrimp are usually found in waters with
temperatures between about 1 and 6 1C and in areas with a soft,
muddy ocean floor at depths between 150 and 600 m, hatching as
larvae that feed on planktonic organisms and sought after as prey
by fish species such as northern cod and Greenland halibut [20].
Although northern shrimp are trawled by Canadian fishers in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence and off the coast of Nova Scotia, contemporary
references to the northern shrimp fishery generally signify two
fishing fleets, offshore and inshore, that operate in the federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) management zones
between the Grand Banks off Newfoundland and just south of the
Arctic ocean off Baffin Island (corresponding to DFO Shrimp
Fishing Areas 0–7) (Fig. 1). Northern shrimp are sensitive to
oceanographic and climate changes and this has shaped in
important ways the history and location of the two fleets
[21,22]. The offshore fleet gained access to shrimp in the late
1970s when shrimp were most abundant in the northern range of
the species, while the inshore fleet based in Newfoundland and
Labrador gained access to northern shrimp in the late 1990s when
a significant growth in biomass occurred in areas off the northeast
coast of Newfoundland and Labrador [23,20]. The two fishing
fleets also have different relationships to coastal communities. The
offshore fleet of factory freezer vessels trawl, process, and freeze
their catch at sea while smaller inshore trawlers ice their catch at
sea and land it fresh in coastal communities for processing. The
growth of the inshore fleet played a crucial role in alleviating the
impact of the 1992 and other groundfish moratoria on some
companies, owner-operators, crew, processing plant workers and
communities. In 1994, the quota for northern shrimp was 22,500
metric tonnes (mt), all caught and processed by offshore factory
freezer trawlers. By 2009, the total allowable catch had increased
to 176,000 mt, with 137,000 mt either landed in coastal commu-
nities by inshore owner-operators and processed by plant workers,
or caught by offshore vessels that paid royalties to cooperatives
and companies that include in their mandates mechanisms to
support reinvesting the revenue in the inshore sector and regional
coastal communities in often remote regions.
The paper focuses on the fisheries allocation policies that
helped produce this pattern and on the regional development
outcomes in three areas in the Canadian province of Newfound-
land and Labrador engaged in the fishery—southeast Labrador, the
Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland, and Fogo Island, Newfound-
land (Fig. 1). The research design included a review of existing
published and gray literature, and intensive field research based
on in-depth key informant interviews carried out in St John's, in
southeast Labrador, on the Northern Peninsula and on Fogo Island
during roughly two-week visits to each region. The Fogo Island
interviews were carried out in February 2012. Field trips to St
Anthony and southeast Labrador took place in March 2012. A total
of 54 individuals were interviewed—17 on Fogo Island, 11 in the
Northern Peninsula region, and 23 in southeast Labrador, as well
as 3 in St. John's with some people key to multiple case studies.
The analysis highlights the specific experiences of the Labrador
Fishermen's Union Shrimp Company, St. Anthony Basin Resources
Incorporated, and the Fogo Island Co-operative [24].
1.2. Conceptual approach
To explain this case, this paper uses Karl Polanyi's concept of
institutional embeddedness, which contrasts forms of economic
development guided by distributive principles that support social
goals with those guided by laissez faire economic principles that
create market conditions for social dislocation [25]. Applied to
analyzing fisheries, the concept of embeddedness posits that state
policies, economies, communities, and organizations can be “inte-
grated systems held together by mechanisms that are legitimized
on moral as well as pragmatic grounds” [26]. An embeddedness
perspective can be used to explain a range of policy choices and
community-based choices defined by the fulfillment of social
goals, rather than by neoliberal principles privileging narrow
conceptions of individual self-interest and economic efficiency. It
shifts the focus away from policies and institutions that disembed
production and social reproduction towards policies and institu-
tions that integrate those realms [27]. This perspective under-
scores how social principles of distribution of access and benefits
guided both state policy and community-based decision-making
in the development of the fishery system examined below.
The next three sections of the paper analyze how enclosure,
quota renting, and commodification—concepts usually associated
with exclusionary consequences of neoliberalism—can be regu-
lated to empower communities and to embed fisheries resources
and development benefits in coastal communities. Part one
P. Foley et al. / Marine Policy ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎2
Please cite this article as: Foley P, et al. Governing enclosure for coastal communities: Social embeddedness in a Canadian shrimp
fishery. Mar. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.11.009i
examines processes of enclosure and allocation following the
extension of Canadian national sovereignty to 200 nautical miles
from shore. During much of this era, Canadian fisheries policy
objectives and institutional arrangements emphasized principles
of geographic adjacency and distribution of benefits for small-
scale and community-based fisheries. Part two focuses on rent
relations controlled by regional and community-based fishery
organizations. Shrimp allocations were used by these organiza-
tions to generate royalties from offshore fisheries and invest them
in processing infrastructure and employment for the benefit of
small-scale fisheries and regional development. Part three exam-
ines policies and regulations constraining two forms of commo-
dification. First, the paper highlights policies that limit and
constrain the commodification of access rights to catch shares,
such as limits on transferability and owner-operator provisions.
Second, the paper highlights policies that help embed wealth
generated from the commodification of wild marine life within
communities through regulations requiring inshore owner-
operators to land their catch in the region for onshore processing.
2. Enclosure: property making by whom and for whose
benefit?
The extension of nation-state jurisdictional sovereignty out to
200 nm starting in the 1970s enclosed, in an unprecedented way,
the most productive parts of oceans and their resources as state
property [28]. State extension of coastal fisheries jurisdiction
provided a powerful legal basis for extending and consolidating
conceptions of coastal fisheries as embedded in society through
public ownership. State controlled resources within EEZs as well as
areas associated with transboundary migratory stocks have since
been a site of struggle given the socio-economic potential and
value of fisheries [29]. The extension of state jurisdiction from 12
to 200 nautical miles also provided states new rights to exclude
foreign fleets and provided access to and control over marine
resources actively fished by fleets from other countries. State
policies towards these resources were affected by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) principle of
optimum utilization. That principle stated that where the coastal
state does not have the capacity to capture the entire allowable
catch, it shall “give other states access to the surplus of the
allowable catch” [30]. In an effort to capture the benefits of
resources for domestic interests, governments around the world
embarked on domestication policies, such as Americanization
[31,32], New Zealandization [33], and Namibianization [34]. In
the process, many states formulated economic strategies to
develop or expand domestic fishing and processing industries to
create infrastructure, jobs and profits, often in economically
marginalized coastal areas. While much policy debate since the
1980s has centered on the institutionalization of narrowly defined
private property rights in various jurisdictions, Canada and other
states developed a diversity of policy objectives and development-
Fig. 1. Canada's northern shrimp fishery areas (SFAs) and the three regions in our study.
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oriented interventions. Some of these policies created opportu-
nities for embedding fisheries access and development benefits in
rural coastal communities.
2.1. Domesticating Atlantic Canadian fisheries for coastal socio-
economic development
The Government of Canada's extension of its fisheries jurisdic-
tion to 200 nm in 1977 brought significant new fisheries resources
under Canadian ownership. Following the extension of jurisdic-
tion, Canadian policy committed to manage fisheries in accordance
with general principles being developed at UNCLOS III, Article 61
of the LOS Consolidated Negotiating Text stating that the coastal
state would set the Total Allowable Catch “to maintain or restore
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce
the maximum sustained yield, as qualified by relevant environ-
mental and economic factors, including the economic needs of
coastal fishing communities” [30]. This reflected the reality that
the extension of state sovereignty over EEZs was fundamentally
justified by nation-state claims to manage and benefit from
resources adjacent to terrestrial coasts. At the same time, an
adjacency principle was often invoked with reference to econom-
ically vulnerable adjacent small-scale fisheries and coastal com-
munities marginalized by the encroachment of distant water
industrial fishing fleets. In anticipation of extended jurisdiction,
policies were developed that combined social principles with
conservation and economic principles [35].
This was the context within which the Government of Canada
developed policies for the gradual displacement of foreign fish-
eries in areas and for species not previously used by Canada [30]
including the northern shrimp fishery. While international legal
frameworks and Canadian fisheries policy created an opportunity
for embedding shrimp fisheries in coastal communities, further
mechanisms more directly anchored shrimp resources in actual
regions and communities. Northern shrimp had previously been
caught by Nordic distant water fleets of factory freezer trawlers
[36] and thus shrimp fishery policy was driven by the goal of using
it to promote employment and regional development in Canada,
and by United Nations obligations to conserve and share fisheries
not exploited by national fleets, leading to an over-arching policy
goal of domesticating, or Canadianizing, the former international
fishery [37].
2.2. Adjacency rights: from national to sub-national resource claims
In line with domestic expectations regarding development and
employment opportunities associated with Canada's control over
groundfish and other stocks, the federal government indicated in
its initial call for proposals that it would prioritize granting shrimp
licenses to three categories of Canadians active in the fishery in
1977: individual fishermen where possible, fishing co-operatives
with processing capacity, and corporations with processing capa-
city [37]. Licensing policy also indicated that access would be
distributed geographically to interests across different East Coast
provinces.
Allocation policies for the Labrador region were shaped by the
specific geographies of the shrimp resource and by related social
principles. At the time, the provincial government of Newfound-
land and Labrador, the provincial fishing industry, and the union
were arguing for priority rights to northern cod off its coast and
made the same argument for the shrimp resource. The president
of the Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers union (FFAW)
urged the DFO Minister to allocate three licenses to people of
coastal Labrador who were most adjacent to the shrimp resource,
which at the time was concentrated off Labrador. The Minister
agreed and decided to make three licenses available to three
regions in Labrador in the application process. After the Minister
announced the federal government would reserve three licenses
for Labrador, the union president organized a meeting among
mainly small boat fishermen and residents of communities along
the southeast coast of Labrador. At the meeting, the group
endorsed the idea, proposed by the union president, of collectively
applying for licenses, and it subsequently established a coopera-
tive (which later reconstituted as the Labrador Fishermen's Union
Shrimp Company) that successfully secured two offshore shrimp
licenses in 1978 (DFO distributed a total of seventeen offshore
shrimp licenses between 1978 and 1990). In this way, allocation
arrangements in the northern shrimp fishery for the Labrador
region were shaped less by responses to the effects of privatization,
like the Alaska Community Development Quota (CDQ) program in
the early 1990s, than by an alignment of social principles shared by
DFO Minister Romeo Leblanc, small-scale fisheries representatives,
and organized interests. One former FFAW union member explained
the importance of Minister LeBlanc's role: “LeBlanc's idea was very
important. He had this vision, as Minister, that there had to be
another thing more than just give a private enterprise the fish to
have full control” (interview 2012).
New opportunities to embed shrimp resources in Newfound-
land and Labrador communities emerged in the 1990s. Adjacency
and coastal economic development goals provided powerful
sources for new resource claims for Newfoundland interests under
conditions of significant environmental change that coincided
with the collapse of cod and groundfish in the 1990s and the
dramatic rise in shellfish populations such as snow crab and
shrimp. During the Canadianization developmental phase in the
1970s and 1980s, the shrimp fishery was located primarily in
northern waters adjacent to Labrador and further north off Baffin
Island. As such, it was taken as given that the new Canadian
shrimp fishery would involve the use of large, capital intensive
factory trawlers that could navigate dangerous and sometimes ice
covered seas year round. In the early 1990s, however, DFO stock
status reports, offshore sector catch rates, and information from
crew of offshore vessels indicated that northern shrimp stocks
were growing rapidly in areas adjacent to southern Labrador and
northeast Newfoundland. Seeing an opportunity to develop a new
inshore fishery, fishermen from Newfoundland and Labrador
lobbied DFO through FFAW crab committees for an opportunity
to access shrimp. A DFO economic assessment of the offshore
shrimp fleet concluded that the economic viability of the offshore
fleet could be maintained at the existing quota levels (an overall
quota of 37,600 mt), and that allocating quotas above this thresh-
old to new participants could be justified.
The DFO Minister faced three options for a situation that
permitted increasing the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for shrimp:
maintain the status quo; distribute increased quota allocations
only to existing offshore license holders; or allocate shrimp
resources to new interests. For the latter option, the Minister
sought input into developing eligibility criteria and sharing for-
mulas to equitably allocate shrimp to new participants. The
Minister stated that “There is a general agreement that should
quotas increase above existing levels, additional access should be
permitted” and “…once a sharing formula for the Northern shrimp
is agreed to, specific access and management criteria will be
developed and individual applications for access to the resource
will be requested” [38]. DFO sent out an Atlantic Canada-wide call
for industry views and proposals on how to share an increase of
northern shrimp quota in 1996 and received almost 160 submis-
sions from individuals, groups, provinces, and municipalities
across Canada [38]. Almost 90 percent of submissions recom-
mended adjacency as a significant principle that should underlie
sharing of northern shrimp TAC [39,38]. The majority of the
proposals indicated that the quota increase should be allocated
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to the inshore fleets [38]. The DFO Minister subsequently
announced that adjacency to the resource would be a “guiding
principle” in new allocations and announced a 57 percent increase
in the TAC of northern shrimp on April 23, 1997. In the face of stiff
opposition from offshore license holders, much of the additional
quota was granted to a group of 300 inshore sector owner-
operators along the northeast and east coast of Newfoundland
and Labrador who were willing and able to meet a set of vessel
requirements.
As part of the 1997–1999 fisheries management plan for
northern shrimp, the minister also granted “A Special Allocation
of 3000 mt for the northern part of the Great Northern Peninsula,
which takes in communities from Big Brook to Goose Cove” [40].
The creation of a Special Allocation to communities represented
another significant policy innovation, the design of which was
guided in part by the lessons learned from the Labrador Fisher-
men's Union Shrimp Company's use of its offshore licenses to
enhance regional development. Following the implementation of
that Special Allocation, DFO granted additional Special Allocations
to community-based organizations and indigenous groups, includ-
ing a 1000 mt annual allocation starting in 2000 for the Fogo
Island Co-operative, which used the principle of adjacency to
justify its claim to DFO. Thus, the decision making process that
embedded shrimp resources in communities was shaped by the
consolidation of spatial resource claims by small-scale owner-
operators and community-based groups adjacent to changing
shrimp resources.
3. Rent for whom and for what purposes?
Enclosure is a means to reorder social wealth-generating
opportunities, but the principles for governing resource access
and property arrangements created through enclosure are also
deeply contested. Mainstream economic approaches suggest that
poorly defined property rights encourage short time horizons in
production and result in rent dissipation [41]. From this perspec-
tive, the solution is to assign more exclusive and limited property
rights so that groups and individuals can capture aggregated
resource rents [42] and to promote commodified property rights
as the rent-maximizing and efficiency maximizing mechanism of
access [41,43]. This is a fundamental rationale for the implemen-
tation of ITQs. Other economists suggest that these evaluations
and principles are methodologically flawed and politically proble-
matic. They instead stress the need to retain public ownership of
resources and call for states to resist ITQs, reassert their ownership
of fish resources within EEZs, and instead require industry to
submit royalty bids for fixed-term leases as a way to return
resource rents to the rightful owner: the public [44]. Both
approaches reinforce relatively narrow conceptions of rent, how-
ever, with even the public-oriented perspective focused on the
state as a manager of resource rents. By contrast, this paper
conceives rent not simply as a technical-economic “thing” but
instead as a politically constructed social relation that is up for
contestation and innovation. Whereas the state can capture rent
from licensing foreign fleets for fees [45] or from licensing
domestic fleets for fees [46], the analysis below shows how rent
relations can also be controlled by community-based groups for
development purposes.
3.1. Charter and royalty arrangements
Following the extension of jurisdiction, Canadian fisheries
policy objectives sought to Canadianize fisheries resources pre-
viously caught by fleets from other countries, but the domestic
industry was not equipped to catch and process certain species. In
response, the Government of Canada developed bridging mechan-
isms to test the technical and economic feasibility of new fisheries
without permanent investment and authorized the temporary
use of fishing or processing capacity from foreign sources.
One bridging mechanism consisted of a Developmental Charters
program whereby a Canadian company could charter a foreign
vessel to catch an allocation of non-traditional species. These
programs were developed for the northern shrimp fishery, which
was conducted exclusively by Danish, Faroese and Norwegian
fishing companies operating in large offshore vessels prior to 1977.
In most fisheries, foreign arrangements were a relatively minor
component of Canadianization efforts [30], but unintentionally
became a source for political and socio-economic innovation in the
northern shrimp fishery. The Government of Canada created a
series of policies to guide the transition towards full Canadianiza-
tion of the northern shrimp fishery, but a patchwork of arrange-
ments and lack of enforcement led to a situation whereby some
license holders purchased their own vessels, some transitioned
into domestic charters, and others continued to rely on foreign
charters that initially performed better economically. This process
resulted in two categories of offshore license holders: vertically
integrated Canadian fishing companies that owned vessels and
fished their own licenses and license holders that contracted or
partially owned an operating company to catch their quota [37].
In southeast Labrador, the Labrador Fishermen's Union Shrimp
Company (LFUSC) initially used its two shrimp licenses to establish
a charter and royalty agreement with a Faroe Islands-based boat
and a Danish company. In the first year, the LFUSC generated a
profit of $750,000 with very little expenses [47]. In the 1980s,
arrangements were complex and not always successful, yet over
time and with more experience the LFUSC was able to negotiate
financially productive and secure arrangements with private com-
panies. The LFUSC advocated with Minister LeBlanc for several years
to grant them an exemption to the federal government's policy to
Canadianize vessels catching shrimp under these licenses. It
resisted the policy because purchasing a vessel would have drained
the bulk of revenues from shrimp sales for the foreseeable future.
As one interview participant explained, “we were just starting out
from scratch. I mean we didn't have anything… and we needed
some money to build up the infrastructure, because we didn't have
any [processing] plants around” (interview 2012). By the early
1990s, the LFUSC had signed a long-term deal with a Canadian
company that held an offshore shrimp license. Intended as a
transitional device to develop a Canadian fishery for northern
shrimp with license holders purchasing vessels to catch their
quotas, DFO permitted domestic royalty charters to continue for
the three licenses granted to Labrador-based groups.
The unplanned extension and success of charter and royalty
arrangements inspired the policy design of the Special Allocations
that emerged in the late 1990s expansion of the fishery. Impor-
tantly, the original Special Allocation designated for the Northern
Peninsula of Newfoundland was not an offshore license and
St. Anthony Basin Resources Incorporated (SABRI), the non-profit
organization created by community groups to administer the
quota, was not authorized to catch the allocation. Instead, SABRI
was authorized to enter into royalty arrangements with offshore
shrimp license holders that owned vessels. In 1997, SABRI dis-
tributed parts of its 3000 mt quota to several offshore companies
on a royalty basis and received about $1.7 million in royalty fees
[48]. The following year, SABRI entered into a 15-year agreement
with one of Canada's largest fishing companies, after putting out a
call for proposals. In a similar fashion, after years of lobbying on
the basis of its adjacency to northern shrimp resources and its
developmental role as a community-based fishing organization,
the Fogo Island Co-operative received a Special Allocation of
northern shrimp of 1000 mt quota in 2000 and secured a contract
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with an offshore shrimp license holder under a royalty arrange-
ment. It generated more than $400,000 annually a few years later.
In addition to having exclusive rights to quota allocations,
community-based groups were able to take advantage of the
competitive pressures among offshore license holders who owned
large vessels and needed large amounts of quota to remain viable.
Despite the structural feature of limited entry fishing licenses in
the offshore shrimp sector, sufficient offshore overcapacity existed
to ensure community quotas were highly valued by offshore vessel
owners. Royalty arrangements were also made over relatively
long time horizons, thus allowing for long-term planning for
community-based allocation holders and allowing them not to
dissipate rent by buying a large offshore vessel. Rent relations can,
therefore, help embed resources and wealth in particular commu-
nities under the right political, institutional, and social conditions.
3.2. Mandating investment in regional development
Northern shrimp resources were embedded in communities
not simply because the state directly allocated resources to
community-based organizations. Nor were benefits embedded in
communities simply because those organizations were able to
capture rents. Rather, benefits were most directly embedded in
communities because those organizations, despite being differ-
ently constituted, were governed by community-oriented distri-
butional principles and development strategies.
In southeast Labrador, the group of small-scale fishers who
decided to collectively apply for offshore shrimp licenses in the
1970s elected a board of directors to represent about 900 fishers
that then resided in the region. The group formed a cooperative
that was later converted to a company, the LFUSC, that maintained
cooperative principles. Shareholders have one vote and own one
share in the company, but cannot receive any dividends. Instead,
the constitution mandates that all profits must be kept within the
company to be reinvested in the region to develop infrastructure
and create employment in the inshore fishery. The constitution of
the LFUSC states that “monies derived from the offshore shrimp
licenses would go into infrastructure along the coast to enhance
the lives of individuals encompassing the whole region” [49]. As
one leader in the company explained:
Yeah, the membership…from the time that it was set up, it's
got a constitution that's a lot different than a lot of other
companies, but one that has worked well, because what they
did, they basically set up their constitution in such a way that,
you know, you could become a shareholder but the only way
you get a share of profits was…through infrastructure that
would be done along the coast. And that, I think that was a key
thing in its success… (interview 2012).
Through its two offshore shrimp licenses, the LFUSC has
generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue that it has
reinvested in communities along Labrador's southeast coast. It
used its licenses to leverage the offshore vessel owners to employ
people from the region on factory freezer trawlers. It purchased a
groundfish plant and two crab plants in the region employing
hundreds of people in the processing sector. It was instrumental in
establishing the Eagle River Credit Union, which now has five
branches in Labrador and one in Newfoundland. And it now
operates Labrador's only shrimp plant, which employs about 150
people in the small community of Charlottetown. In 2010, the
LFUSC made an $11 million investment in replacing a crab plant it
operated in the community of Mary's Harbour over the prior three
decades, expecting to employ 65–85 seasonal workers in the
community of about 400 residents. The revenues generated
through its two offshore shrimp licenses remains the backbone
for the LFUSC, enabling it to make substantial investments in other
fisheries and activities. As a manager explained:
The offshore licenses are the blood that flows through our
veins. They are the thing that breathes life into us in the
beginning and they still help a lot today. Now obviously, we got
four or five plants today, that contributes enormously to our
success. Some are up some years, some are down. And other
years, the other one is up, and the other one's down…But the
offshore licenses have been the blood that has flowed to keep
the life in the company. And it continues to do that, and we're
hoping that it'll do, you know, contribute a lot toward that
going forward. We're a major company now…but at the same
time, if ya didn't have the offshore licenses, it would be very,
very difficult to continue operating (interview 2012).
In the case of the Northern Peninsula, DFO granted the original
Special Allocation for shrimp not to an organization but to a group
of communities within a defined geographic area with about 4000
people. Individuals and community groups subsequently orga-
nized and created the non-profit organization St. Anthony Basin
Resources Incorporated (SABRI) to manage to the 3000 mt annual
quota. The group created a volunteer management Board made up
of 15 members including five fisherpersons, four fish plant
employees, four community representatives, and two representa-
tives from development committees in the region. The organiza-
tion adopted a mandate to “administer a 3000 mt allocation of
Northern Shrimp on behalf of the communities from Big Brook to
Goose Cove, in a manner resulting in expansion of the region's
economic base and improved employment opportunities in har-
mony with a rural setting and lifestyle.”
SABRI drew on the experiences of the LFUSC when it developed
its 15-year arrangement with a large Canadian fishing company to
catch its allocation in return for royalties and other development
benefits. SABRI made several conditions on the agreement with
the company to contribute to regional development, including
offloading 3000 mt of product at St. Anthony and employing
fishermen from the area on the company's offshore vessels. SABRI
divided the region into 5 zones to help spread out jobs fairly over
the region and by 1999, 24 fishermen were employed full-time on
three offshore factory vessels [50]. Most importantly, the long-
term proposal stipulated that the company catching its allocation
would have to establish a processing facility in St. Anthony to
process shrimp and other species. The multi-species plant that was
subsequently built created work for over 200 people in the region.
Over the next decade, SABRI also invested millions in fisheries
development activities, including helping establish a cold storage
facility in St. Anthony that stores fish from Labrador and the
Northern Peninsula before it's shipped directly to market in
Europe and elsewhere. It has also invested millions in infrastruc-
ture, scholarships, donations, and community grants. According to
an elected municipal representative in the region:
that shrimp agreement and that quota is what saved this part
of the Northern Peninsula because without that we wouldn't be
anywhere close to where we are today in regards to not only
the fishery and the plants and all that, but in regards to our
towns and our people and economic development and every-
thing else. It's been a huge cloverleaf, really, you know, if you
want to look at it for all of this area, the development that's
gone has been unbelievable. The way that the area has worked
together… all the communities have banded together and
worked because each community has representation on the
board of SABRI (interview 2012).
Unlike LFUSC and SABRI, the Fogo Island Co-operative pre-
existed its shrimp allocation. It was created in the late 1960s to
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help prevent federal-provincial government efforts to resettle the
island's residents following the departure of private fish mer-
chants from the island. In the late 1990s as some of its inshore
owner-operator members gained access to shrimp permits, the
Co-op began lobbying for a shrimp allocation in part as a way to
provide the funds needed to pay for the construction of a shrimp
plant, to upgrade its crab plant, and to diversify into other
fisheries. Senior members of the Co-op knew that SABRI was
using royalties acquired from firms catching its Special Allocation
to develop a shrimp processing plant in the St. Anthony region and
they hoped to follow a similar model. By 2000, the Co-op had
succeeded on both fronts—it had secured a license to process
shrimp from the provincial government and it had been granted a
Special Allocation of 1000 mt of shrimp by the federal govern-
ment. The Co-op's allocation—the smallest community allocation
of the three studied here - generated millions in revenue during
the years 2000–2011. It used these funds to finance the construc-
tion of a shrimp plant and to upgrade crab processing facilities, to
employ processing plant workers, and continue its role as the
economic backbone of Fogo Island, which has a population of
about 2500 people. According to one of the Co-op's leaders at the
time, royalty payments from just the first few seasons allowed the
co-op:
to invest in exploring new markets, value-added secondary
processing, research into partnering with a Chinese firm into
sea cucumber production—all of those types of activities we're
doing to try to expand the employment opportunities and the
revenues to our inshore fishers. That's what we're doing. This
money is being used for economic development. I guess that's
the point we're trying to make here with common resources.
Communities have the ability to be able to create sustainable
economic opportunities in their communities. If common
resources are going to be allocated, then we should look at
what those communities can do with those resources once
given to them [51].
In summary, investments in processing plants played a crucial
developmental role in each case. They enabled inshore owner-
operators based in the region and elsewhere to land product in the
region and support local employment. Thus, the nature and extent
of the economic development benefits achieved in each region
depended heavily on the presence of productive inshore fishing
and processing activities, and on allocation criteria and organiza-
tional mandates to support regional economic development. In
turn, a specific policy environment conducive to embedding social
purpose in fisheries governance enabled these criteria and
mandates.
4. Commodification by whom and for what purposes?
Processes of marine enclosure often involve the allocation of
privileges or rights to access and use fisheries resources for
commercial purposes. Commodification plays a role in commercial
fisheries in two important ways. One process of commodification
refers to the state or other actors making the privilege or right to
fish transferable through the marketplace and is most often
understood to be the quintessential neoliberal approach to fish-
eries governance. Commodification of fishing rights through the
political and legal sanctioning of transferability creates conditions
for severing resources from coastal livelihoods and communities
[14,15,52] and can trigger radical changes in who fishes, where,
and when they fish, the products sold, and the balance of power
among industry participants and sectors [53]. However, in many if
not all fisheries, access privileges and rights are not fully commo-
dified and marketized but instead regulated by policies,
institutions, and social relations to varying degrees. In some cases,
for example, individual quotas have been implemented, but
restrictions have been placed on the ability of quota holders to
transfer or sell quotas [54,11]. The second process of commodifica-
tion occurs in all commercial fisheries: wild marine life is
transformed into commodities when they are caught and traded
and sold on the market. In the Atlantic Canadian fisheries,
including the shrimp fisheries, both processes of commodification
have been regulated in specific ways by federal and provincial
authorities that help embed significant portions fishing wealth in
rural coastal communities.
4.1. Constraints on the commodification of access rights
In the offshore shrimp fishery, the Government of Canada
implemented policies to Canadianize the shrimp fishery in the
late 1970s and 1980s and placed a series of conditions on new
license holders to limit foreign investment and involvement that
conflict with neoliberal trade and investment liberalization prin-
ciples generally supported by the Canadian and some other
governments today.3 However, the offshore shrimp fishery in
which the LFUSC holds two licenses operates under an Enterprise
Allocation system that was established in 1987 in the early
privatization policy shift towards implementing individual quota
systems and rights-based systems [39]. Under this catch share
program, each license holder receives an equal allocation within
each Shrimp Fishing Area based on a sharing formula (1/17th
each). The northern shrimp TAC was divided evenly between each
of the offshore licenses, with the size of each quota increasing
from about 1200 mt in 1987 to 2211 mt in 1996, the year before
access was granted to the inshore sector and to Special Allocations.
The Enterprise Allocation approach is in some ways consistent
with neoliberal policies because licenses can be transferred
permanently with the sale of the company holding licenses. Yet
the system does not fully commodify allocations. Annual alloca-
tions can be transferred only to other offshore shrimp license
holders and only on a temporary basis within season, which
occurs when, for example, a company is unable to catch its quota
and decides to transfer remaining quota to another license holder
[39].4 The introduction of this allocation system in the late 1980s
initially had significant buy-in from the Newfoundland and Lab-
rador fish workers union because at that time, many of the
licenses were held by community-based groups and the system
was expected to help provide stability to the communities in
which offshore license holders, such as the LFUSC, were
embedded. However, as one union official explained, over time
some of these resource allocations have become separated from
communities. The ownership change of one major offshore com-
pany in NL resulted in a major transfer of operations and assets,
including offshore shrimp license, out of a rural community in
which the original company was based. A short period of license
consolidation occurred following the introduction of Enterprise
Allocations in the late 1980s as some licenses changed hands,
resulting in the current situation of twelve organizations holding
seventeen licenses (interview 2012). While offshore licenses can
be transferred through corporate ownership changes, there are
greater constraints against the commodification of access rights
for quotas granted to specific communities, regions, and
3 Despite DFO reports that full Canadianization of the offshore fleet was
achieved in 1990, complex corporate ownership arrangements obscure continued
foreign interest in the offshore fleet [37].
4 The relative stability of the fishery may support the argument that the effect
of tradability on efficiency is probably limited to trades within a single fishing
season [46].
P. Foley et al. / Marine Policy ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 7
Please cite this article as: Foley P, et al. Governing enclosure for coastal communities: Social embeddedness in a Canadian shrimp
fishery. Mar. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.11.009i
indigenous groups through Special Allocations, which cannot be
transferred permanently.
The inshore fishing sector in Atlantic Canada is regulated in
certain ways that facilitate the embedding of resource benefits in
coastal communities, including ways that are more substantial and
direct than are found in the offshore sector. As explained above,
the ability of the holders of offshore licenses and Special Alloca-
tions in the three case study regions to access, and benefit from,
shrimp depended to a substantial degree on the presence and
involvement of embedded inshore fishing enterprises and local
processing opportunities, largely controlled by these enterprises to
which they could sell their catch. The capacity of the inshore
fishing fleet and processing sector to contribute to socio-economic
development in the three regional case studies was further
enhanced by specific policy measures that facilitate distribution
of access and benefits. Although federal policies restricting access
through limited entry and quotas expanded following the exten-
sion of jurisdiction, other restrictions on access were introduced to
enhance the distribution of benefits within small-scale fisheries
and coastal communities. The Government of Canada divided
Atlantic Canada's fishing fleet into three sectors: inshore (vessels
under 35 ft in length), midshore (vessels between 35 and 65 ft in
length),5 and offshore (vessels over 65 ft in length). In the 1970s,
federal Minister of DFO Romeo LeBlanc, who was also instrumen-
tal in the allocation of shrimp to cooperatives and regionally-based
groups, sought to institute protections for small-scale fisheries and
fishery-dependent coastal communities in Atlantic Canada by
introducing an Owner-Operator Policy and a Fleet Separation
Policy. The Fleet Separation Policy applies to fishing vessels less
than 65 ft in length and is designed to prevent the issuance of
inshore licenses to corporations, including processing companies.
The Owner-Operator Policy applies to license holders using vessels
that are less than 65 ft in length and requires license holders to be
present on their vessels and personally fish their license [55]. The
goal of the two policies is to promote distribution of fishing access
and to restrict vertically integrated fishing companies from own-
ing and consolidating their ownership of vessels. The policies
prevent the separation of quota ownership from active participa-
tion that resulted in both the corporate consolidation of quotas
and the widespread leasing and renting of quotas in Canada's
Pacific fisheries, where there are no owner operator policies in
place [12]. Within the distinct Atlantic Canadian fisheries policy
context, DFO restricted access to shrimp to inshore owner-
operators in Newfoundland and Labrador who were adjacent to
shrimp grounds. Over 300 owner-operators gained access to the
new inshore shrimp permits following the 1997 expansion. The
key overall point is that some existing small-scale owner-opera-
tors were able to take advantage of policies preventing the
separation of quota ownership from active participation by gearing
up for shrimp fishing and acquiring access permits.
4.2. Embedding commodity values in communities
A series of policies has also promoted the development of
onshore processing and employment opportunities in both the
offshore and inshore fisheries, with much more success in the
latter. Vessels in the offshore sector were already owned
predominantly by fishing companies in the late 1970s [56], but
Minister Leblanc intended to provide licenses to companies,
cooperatives and community-based organizations with processing
capacity. Initial policies in the late 1970s required offshore license
holders to land and process onshore at least 50 percent of their
catch in Canada as a way to generate onshore employment, but the
policy was dropped at the end of the first year of the fishery
because it was apparently more profitable for license holders to
process shrimp onboard vessels [37]. The degree to which onshore
processing benefits were embedded in communities subsequently
evolved in very different ways within the offshore shrimp sector.
While the relationship of most offshore shrimp license holders to
communities became more tenuous through the entrenchment of
onboard processing, processing benefits remained embedded in
southeast Labrador through indirect means. The LFUSC institutio-
nalized a strategy of reinvesting revenues it gained from its
offshore charter arrangements into onshore processing of ground-
fish, pelagics, crab, and shrimp supplied not by offshore vessels but
instead by vessels in the small-scale, inshore fishing sector.
Inshore sector processing has remained crucial to community
and regional development in these cases. Provincial government
policies have been especially important enabling factors for
processing opportunities in Newfoundland and Labrador, the
location of the three case study regions. During the study period,
the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador maintained
policies emphasizing a regional distribution and balance of allo-
cating processing licenses, resulting in the allocation of processing
licenses along the northeast coast of Newfoundland for the inshore
shrimp sector in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It also maintained
minimum processing requirements (MPR) legislation through the
Fish Inspections Act, which required over 30 species caught by
provincial fishers to be processed in the province before exported.
There is one shrimp processing plant in each case study region and
about 20 inshore vessels landed significant volumes of shrimp for
processing in each plant. Thus, the provincial government's role in
obliging inshore owner-operators to land fish locally to enhance
processing infrastructure and employment complimented the
federal government's role in instituting direct allocation of shrimp
based on geographic adjacency and community development
criteria. These provincial policies and organizational strategies
were not coordinated with federal allocation policy but had the
effect of reinforcing the distribution of access and benefits and
further embedding resources in our three case study regions.
In summary, the enclosure of the northern shrimp fishery in
Atlantic Canada is an example of only partial commodification.
Indeed, policies and institutions governing both the right to fish
and the way in which fish are processed and traded in this fishery
blur the lines between commodification and decommodification.
While commodification receives much attention in critical ana-
lyses of the effects of neoliberalism on fisheries governance, this
case provides an example of policies that regulate against “pure”
commodification by instituting social and distributional principles.
5. Discussion: lessons for embedding alternatives
The embedding of enclosure, rent relations, and commodifica-
tion in Newfoundland and Labrador coastal communities has
broad relevance. This analysis enhances our knowledge of the
growing range of existing embedded alternatives and it enhances
our understanding of the conditions under which new alternatives
might emerge. It also provides practical insight into the impor-
tance of defending and developing innovative principles and
politics of social purpose. Three core interrelated lessons are
discussed below.
5 The inshore shrimp fishery under discussion in this paper is made up of
vessels between 45 and 65 ft in length, which according to this categorization are
technically midshore vessels. However, most contemporary policy and industry
discourse refers to this segment of the fishery as an inshore fishery. For this reason,
the paper uses the terms inshore and owner-operator, rather than midshore, for
this fishery. Similarly, there is some indication that not all of these licenses are still
owned and controlled by owner-operators but no data are available on the extent
to which processors and others have acquired them.
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First, the case above provides insight into the conditions under
which embedded alternatives emerge. Rather than privilege single
domains or logics, such as state policy, property, economy, com-
munity, or organizations, the analysis above supports the idea that
fisheries and fishery-dependent communities are co-constituted
domains of political–economic and socio-cultural assemblages
[31,32,65]. For this reason, recent studies have underscored the
need to understand the historical specificity and contextual com-
plexity of social relations that constitute particular fisheries [7,66].
In the case study examined above, the development of policies,
institutions, and social relations that enabled community-based
groups to access resources and provide better chances of local
socio-economic development occurred under specific circum-
stances. Factors that enabled them to access resource benefits
included: (1) windows of opportunity for policy innovation in both
the extension of jurisdiction in the 1970s and in the environmental
shift favoring growth in shrimp in the 1990s, (2) the presence of
organized interests with access to information and influential
political allies, and (3) the alignment of values between key
political leaders and organized fishing interests and political will-
ingness to implement policies with explicit objectives to benefit
rural coastal regional and community development. Factors that
empowered small-scale fisheries and enhanced community capa-
city and agency for effective community-based development
alternatives included: (1) the availability of important resources,
including local leadership and organized networks, (2) the capa-
city to imagine development alternatives to private enterprise and
the capacity to negotiate agreements with private interests, (3) the
presence of a strong incentive and capacity (e.g., overcapacity) for
offshore fleets to engage in royalty arrangements, (4) the presence
of organizational and structural constraints that limit capital flight
and embed profit and wealth in communities (e.g., organizational
mandates for regional development, owner-operator and fleet
separation policies, minimum processing requirements), and
(5) the active community-based inshore fishery and processing
sector supported by an enabling policy context both federally and
provincially. This particular pattern of conditions observed are
perhaps unique to this fishery, but the enabling conditions are
comparable to those present or absent in other cases and thus
should provide insight into the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the development of alternative fishery systems.
Second, the analysis above both adds a new case study of
embedded alternatives to the literature and enhances the potential
for developing comparative lessons. Indeed, many fisheries are
similarly constituted through policies and institutions that are
antithetical to neoliberal principles [57]. These include policies
and institutions that tie access and ownership rights and wealth
creation to communities or regions through residency require-
ments, owner-operator licensing provisions, minimum processing
requirements, support for subsistence fisheries, limitations on the
mobility of capital, and share systems of compensation. Even in
fisheries where ITQs have been fully implemented, moral econo-
mies often persist through such mechanisms as provisions to
prevent absentee ownership [12]. Alternatives have also emerged
elsewhere through direct allocations to groups of fishers and
community groups with constraints on their use and transferabil-
ity. Since the 1980s, cases of the allocation of shares of quotas to
organized groups of fishers, co-operatives and multi-stakeholder
groups within which decisions about more detailed sub-
allocations are made have emerged across North America and
Europe. Well-documented examples include a community man-
agement board program for small-scale fisheries in the Scotian
Shelf region of Atlantic Canada [58,11], producer organization
quota management programs in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom [59], the Alaska Community Development Quota pro-
gram [60,61,3] and community-oriented sector management
developed in the last decade in the Northeast US [1]. In some
cases quotas or shares have been allocated to marginalized
community groups rather than to individuals [62,63,33]. Despite
the prominent discourse suggesting that fisheries in developed
countries are evolving on an inevitable path towards privatized
and commodified access regimes, with community-based
approaches only suitable for artisanal fisheries in the developing
world [64], this case and others show clearly that embedded
alternatives are evolving and emerging even in large, industrial,
export oriented fisheries that are competing internationally. These
cases show the significant potential that exists for alternative
types of fishery systems, but this case and the communities
studied should not be overly idealized. While this paper highlights
policies and institutions that generated benefits for coastal areas in
the emergence of embedded alternatives, institutions and rela-
tions shaped by social justice and distributional considerations in
this fishery, as in others, exist alongside relations of hierarchy,
exclusion, subordination, and inequity. Allocation and distribution
of shrimp resources and benefits included tough choices to include
and exclude potential beneficiaries in both the early development
of the fishery beginning in the 1970s and in the expansion of the
fishery in the 1990s; both policy makers and community-based
organizations faced these tough choices. As in other fishery
systems, problematic and precarious labor relations within and
between owner-operator fleets and seafood processing plants
were also present in the northern shrimp fishery. And the com-
munities and regions studied above are not self-contained homo-
genous units, but heterogeneous, fluid, and emergent assemblages
of social relations [26] that can be obscured by generalized and
sometimes problematic notions of “community” benefits. The key
lesson for this paper, however, is that the policies and institutions
governing resource access and market relations in this fishery
were shaped in profound ways by principles that promote embed-
ding wealth in fishery-dependent coastal communities, with
significant effects for enhancing employment and livelihood
opportunities of thousands of people living in remote coastal
communities in Newfoundland and Labrador.
Finally, this research provides practical lessons for scientists,
practitioners, and community-based groups working through the
muddy waters of enclosure politics. Focusing on the allocation and
control of resources allows us to ask critical policy questions about
whose property and for what developmental purpose [3], ques-
tions central to understanding the political economy and political
ecology of fisheries [67]. Political and social institutions and
arrangements can shape who gets access to what in the enclosure
and privatization of fisheries in profound ways [68]. The literature
on alternatives for small-scale fisheries and fisheries-dependent
communities suggests that who gets access to what, and how they
access and manage benefits, can occur in diverse and unique ways.
However, why access is granted and attained can be based on more
generalizable, shared concerns for social, rather than market,
principles. This point can be illustrated by comparing the differ-
ences and similarities between northern shrimp allocations and
Alaska's CDQ program. The origins of embedded alternatives in the
northern shrimp fishery in the late 1970s arguably precede the
ascendancy of neoliberalism, which contrasts with the Alaska CDQ
program's origins as a response to negative effects of neoliberal
privatization in the US state's fisheries [3]. Also, embedded
alternatives in the northern shrimp fishery evolved not only from
federal allocation policies oriented towards supporting existing
and new cooperatives and community-based groups but also from
unintentional but enduring rent arrangements that emerged and
became institutionalized through Special Allocations. This process
contrasts with the CDQ program's very specific legal and regula-
tory guidelines governing allocation and community management
of quotas and benefits [3]. The reasons why fisheries resources
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were allocated to particular groups in Newfoundland and Labrador
and in Alaska are quite similar, however, with allocation driven in
both cases by general principles of resource claims and distribu-
tion of benefits in coastal fisheries: the idea that groups living in
coastal regions adjacent to marine resources ought to benefit from
the development of those resources. Integrating such social purpose
and values, including social justice and ethics considerations, in
fisheries governance is inherently and necessarily political and
regulatory, an issue that policy makers in the USA are facing as
they think about what catch shares could and should mean for
coastal communities. A strict commitment to market principles
does not recognize these social principles and considerations as
legitimate, and thus proponents of neoliberalism tend to favor more
radically marketized allocations such as ITQs, seeking to remove
politics (and democracy and social concerns) from the allocation
process. Cases like the northern shrimp fishery and the Alaska CDQ
program, while differing in important respects, illustrate how
innovative forms of enclosure can emerge for collections of com-
munities representing extensive geographic areas in relatively
thinly populated remote coastal communities adjacent to fishery
resources. Enclosure in these cases sought to institutionalize ethical
principles and criteria incorporating considerations related to the
distribution of access and benefits into allocation policies. Including
such principles and criteria into fisheries policy is inherently
political, as is not doing so.
6. Conclusion
Proponents of neoliberalism advocate for market principles to
govern the allocation of goods, services, and natural resources,
necessitating an ideological commitment to enclosing and com-
modifying everything [69,70–72]. While the global political trend
of neoliberalism is transforming many societal institutions—
including fisheries governance regimes—into more liberalized
and commodified social relations that disembed nature and
economy from society, its disciplinary influence is neither com-
plete nor uniform [73]. The rise of neoliberalism in fisheries is
punctuated by political economies, political ecologies, and govern-
ance institutions premised on social principles of distribution of
access and benefits that create further opportunities for imagining
and instituting embedded alternatives. It has been argued here
that social purpose policies and practices supporting the ability of
otherwise marginalized small-scale fisheries and coastal regions to
retain access to local fisheries and local processing are critical to
their survival and provide a relatively equitable and economically
viable alternative to neoliberal policies whose negative impacts on
such communities and regional economies have been only
too well and tragically documented. The broader lesson is that
paying close attention to alternative enclosure policies and orga-
nizational forms that directly embed nature and economy into
society in this case and in others can help shift global discussions
and policies in more ecologically, economically, and socially
integrated directions.
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